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The Evolving Context of Mine Action1 
 
 
Introduction  
The purpose of this study is two-fold: 1) to examine the changing nature of arms control and 
disarmament, focusing on what appear to be a few of the most promising frameworks for 
tackling the relationship between weapons management and the wider goals of development, 
security and peacebuilding; and 2) to reflect that thinking back onto mine action itself.  
 
The study, by providing an overview of the wider context within which mine action is 
operating, sketches out dimensions that seem of particular relevance to thinking about the 
future of mine action in an increasingly complex and challenging global context.  
 
 
I.   The expanding scenery of arms control and disarmament 
 
The last 20 years or so have seen new attention to many dimensions of the realities and impact 
of conventional weapons in our world. In part, this has been a function of the ending of the 
Cold War, which had disguised many of these realities in traditional east-west conflict terms. In 
part, it is a result of new technologies and the employment of a broad range of weapons 
systems by actors other than states.  In part, it has been the result of the engagement of new 
actors beyond those usually concerned with arms control and disarmament issues. This section 
of the paper will begin with a general overview of the multilateral agreements on weapons 
control that have been taken during this period. It will then turn to the more important 
dynamics that appear to be currently shaping the context of conventional weapons control 
initiatives and beyond. 
 
A. Conventional weapons management today 
 
An analysis of the last 20 years from a strict multilateral arms control and disarmament 
approach would not lead one to feel very encouraged about this way of doing business—
except in the area of “conventional” weapons. Because of the realities of the Cold War, 
attention to arms control and disarmament in the area of conventional weapons was dwarfed 
until the early 1990s by the so-called “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) agenda. 
Important exceptions included the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) (less 
an arms control agreement than an extension of international law on restrictions on the 
methods of warfare), the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of 1990 (a 
regional agreement), the 1991 UN Register of Conventional Arms (a transparency in 
armaments initiative), and the 1996 Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for 
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (a producer-driven export control 
agreement).  
 
From the mid-1990s on, it has been primarily in the realm of control and disarmament efforts 
related to different conventional weapons systems that there has been substantial movement 
by States to agree new norms, practices and institutions. This period has also seen a venturing                                                         
1 This paper was commissioned by the GICHD to an independent expert and mostly drafted by David Atwood.  
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by States into new means for seeking to reach such agreements, at times going outside the 
established multilateral negotiating systems, as with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention 
(APMBC)(1997) and the Cluster Munitions Convention (CCM)(2008).  
 
The motivations for action leading to those agreements that have emerged since the mid-
1990s have come from a variety of sources, with traditional “national security” motives for 
arms control and disarmament agreements no longer being necessarily the primary ones, and 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) considerations playing a greater role. The list of 
significant agreements over this period includes: Protocol IV (“blinding lasers”) to the CCW 
(1996), the APMBC (1997), the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in 
Firearms, their parts and components and ammunition to the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime (2001) the UN Programme of Action on Illicit Trade in Small 
Arms and Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (UN PoA) (2001), Protocol V (“Explosive 
Remnants of War”) to the CCW (2003), the CCM (2008), and the most recent legally binding 
convention, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) (2013). In addition, there have been a number of 
important regional agreements adding to this constellation.  
 
The agreements reached in the last 20 years vary in their basis in international law, their legal 
or political nature, the scope of their application, the numbers of adhering states, etc. Each of 
these has been spawned or followed by a whole series of institutions, practices, and 
methodologies that further fill this picture out. Four examples illustrate this: International 
Mine Action Standards (IMAS) have codified mine action practices; the International Amunition 
Technical Guidelines (IATG) provides guidance for the stockpile management of conventional 
ammunition; the International Tracing Instrument to Enable States to Identify or Trace Illicit 
Small Arms and Light Weapons (2005) was an early attempt to move beyond the general 
language of the UN PoA; the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development 
indirectly followed from the focus on small arms and light weapons exemplified in the UN PoA. 
In addition to the many processes for seeking to implement or to strengthen existing 
conventional weapons agreements, new initiatives, such as the use of explosive weapons in 
populated areas, the development of fully autonomous weapons (so-called “killer robots”), 
and defining the limits of acceptable use of so-called “non-lethal” weapons, are now pushing 
their way onto the international agenda.  
 
B. Approaches and narratives around weapons management  
 
The above provides but a brief picture of some of the structural patterns of conventional arms 
control and disarmament initiatives from around the mid-1990s. A range of narratives, briefly 
sketched here, will further elaborate this picture. These are not unique or mutually exclusive. 
In fact they can be seen to be highly inter-related and overlapping, some more closely defined 
by weapons themselves and others drawing their orientation from broader security-related 
and general socio-economic foundations. They illustrate some of the orientations currently 
shaping policy and practice. Observations on their contributions, emphasizing those that 
appear to be of greatest relevance to mine action thinking at the present time, are then 
offered. 
 
Humanitarian Disarmament  
The term “humanitarian disarmament” had not yet been coined in the early 1990s as the call 
to move beyond ineffective measures to control the use of landmines took shape. The 
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campaign to actually ban this weapons system and subsequent multilateral action on 
landmines was spawned from the perspective that the landmine was a weapon requiring more 
vigorous multilateral attention due to the impact that its use was observed to be having in 
terms of deaths, injuries, and livelihoods of innocent men, women and children in affected 
regions of the world. The foundation of the concern about this particular weapons system was 
thus, in this respect, “humanitarian”, a view that came to be seen in this case as outweighing 
any continuing military value of the weapon itself.  This orientation shaped the movement 
towards the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and has continued to drive the nature of the 
successful implementation of that instrument.  
 
The term “humanitarian disarmament” provides a useful label for the orientation and 
motivation that has driven subsequent efforts to ban cluster munitions, initiatives on the use 
of explosive weapons in populated areas, on new weapons systems such as “killer robots” and 
others, and today even provides an underpinning for new initiatives to rid the world of nuclear 
weapons. This approach has provided the basis for the engagement of a wide range of actors 
from communities such as health, human rights and development, ones not traditionally 
associated with activism in the disarmament sphere. Moreover, it has been the motivating 
factor for the engagement of civil society organizations well beyond those normally labelled as 
“disarmament” or “peace” organizations. As was noted by a “summit” of such organizations 
held in New York in October 2012 in a statement that rather neatly sums up this orientation: 
“We support strong disarmament initiatives driven by humanitarian imperatives to strengthen 
international law and protect civilians. By advancing disarmament from a humanitarian 
perspective, we seek to prevent further civilian casualties, avoid socio-economic devastation, 
and protect and ensure the rights of victims. We represent non-governmental organizations 
and coalitions working in the field of humanitarian disarmament, with the shared objectives of 
protecting civilians from the harmful effects of armed violence.” (Communiqué, Humanitarian 
Disarmament Campaigns Summit, New York, 20 – 21 October 2012). This orientation begins 
from the weapon and its perceived humanitarian effects and suggests control measures and 
appropriate policies and practices in relation to the weapon, based on the goal of reducing or 
preventing human suffering.  
 
Armed Violence Reduction (AVR) 
Increasingly in recent years, approaches to dealing with weapons and their effects have come 
to be more comprehensively understood from or incorporated within an “armed violence” 
perspective. Armed violence is defined by the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and 
Development as “the intentional use of illegitimate force (actual or threatened) with arms or 
explosives against a person, group, community, or state, which undermines people-centered 
security and/or sustainable development”. While policies and instruments for controlling, 
regulating, and managing the availability and use of arms and explosives continue as an 
essential component of this orientation, an armed violence perspective also draws attention to 
the “drivers” and risk factors associated with the use or mis-use of the instruments of violence. 
 
This orientation emerged in large part from the growing focus in the 1990s on small arms and 
light weapons and the realization that “supply” solutions were a necessary but insufficient way 
of approaching the reduction and prevention of the realities of armed violence. This is 
illustrated by one central observation: an estimated 526,000 people died per year as a result of 
lethal violence during the period 2004 – 2009 (Global Burden of Armed Violence (GBAV), 2011). 
In responding to this challenge, a landmines-like ban solution was simply not on the cards for 
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the more than 800 million SALWs believed to be extant in the world, to say nothing of the 
continued perceived legitimacy of the possession of SALW for the roles of the police and 
armed forces. Reducing the realities of armed violence came also to be understood as 
requiring the tackling those factors which could be understood as driving the demand and 
(mis)use of weapons by individuals and groups.  
 
As illustrated via the AVR lens below (See Box 1), an armed violence orientation draws 
attention not only to the instruments and the differing ways in which people are affected by 
armed violence but also to the range of approaches, policies and programmes that seek 1) to 
address directly the instruments, actors, and institutional environments that enable armed 
violence (e.g. firearms regulation, risk education, community safety and security); 2) those that 
are more indirect in that they address proximate and structural risk factors giving rise to armed 
violence (e.g. employment for at-risk youths, access to justice); and 3) those that are mainly 
about broader development programming, which, while not targeting armed violence as their 
central purpose, may nevertheless have the effect of reducing armed violence (e.g. urban 
renewal, improvements in public transport, environmental resource management). (See OECD, 
Investing in Security: A Global Assessment of Armed Violence Reduction Initiatives, 2011). 
 
The AVR orientation has come to draw ever more elements into its orbit as understanding has 
increased. Crime, health, employment, urbanisation and other spheres are increasingly 
understood as being of relevance, spheres that extend far beyond the more restricted, 
weapon-based nature of “humanitarian disarmament”. 
 
Box 1  
 
The Armed Violence Reduction (AVR) Lens 
  
In 2009, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the small 
volume Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling Development set out what it called the “armed 
violence lens”. The AVR “lens” offered by the OECD provides a particularly helpful way of 
depicting and placing many initiatives which may not in themselves be labelled specifically as 
armed violence reduction or prevention measures.  
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Source: Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling Development, OECD, 2009, p. 50) 
 
As this figure reveals, the development of approaches to armed violence reduction can be 
helped by considering:  
- the people affected by armed violence—both direct and indirect victims; 
- the perpetrators/agents who commit such violence and the motivations behind those 
actions; 
- the instruments of armed violence (with a focus on their availability/supply); 
- the institutions or institutional/cultural environment that enables or protects against armed 
violence 
 
As noted in the GBAV 2011 report: “The lens provides a flexible and unified framework for 
apprehending the contexts, motives, and risk factors associated with armed violence. Its three 
legs provide different entry points for armed violence prevention and reduction policies.” 
(GBAV, 2011, p.36).  Important in the use of the lens are the linkages that can be understood 
between the four dimensions (with people at the center) as well as the linkages between 
action at different levels (local, national, regional, and global).  
 
While all the approaches described in this section of this study cannot be easily placed within 
the framework provided by the lens, it does help to locating the principal orientations of a 
number of these.  
 
 
Security and Development 
The AVR orientation highlights the negative development effects of different manifestations of 
armed violence and conversely to the potential positive impact of development programming 
on reducing levels of armed violence. In 2006, the growing understanding of this relationship 
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was symbolized in the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, now adhered 
to by 112 States. UN Development Programme (UNDP), the OECD, some national development 
agencies and civil society organizations have emphasized this relationship in their analysis and 
programming. For example, in 2011, the World Development Report of the World Bank chose 
“Conflict, Security and Development” as its central theme and illustrated through strong 
evidence the negative effects on development that conflict and violence prone countries are 
experiencing. As noted in that report: “People in fragile and conflict-affect states are more 
likely to be impoverished, to miss out on schooling, and to lack access to basic health services. . 
. . As the world takes stock of progress on the MDGs [Millennium Development Goals], it is 
apparent that the gap between violence-prone countries and other developing countries is 
widening. No low-income, fragile state has achieved a single MDG, and few are expected to 
meet targets by 2015.” (World Development Report, 2011, p. 63)  
 
Other relevant dimensions of this orientation include analyses of the consequences for 
economic and social development because of the high priority given to military expenditures, 
as well as the economic costs of dealing with the consequences of violence (for example, the 
recent study by the Institute for Economics and Peace on “The Economic Cost of Violence 
Containment”, 2014).  
 
Despite the growing evidence of these relationships and despite the engagement with them by 
significant global actors, there has been only limited evidence of a prioritization of the need to 
tackle the factors related to conflict and insecurity as part of development planning and 
spending. Even in one of the most important settings of current development goal priority 
setting, the debates currently taking place around what will follow the Millennium 
Development Goals established in 2000, there are doubts as to whether what will emerge from 
the negotiations will contain much that reflects the increasingly well understood relationship 
between peace and development. At this writing, there is considerable support for the 
inclusion of a new development goal related to peace and security, and growing evidence of 
the measurability of targets in relation to such a goal.2 However, it is by no means certain that 
any such goal, however demonstrable its centrality to development is, will survive the political 
nature of the negotiations. Nevertheless, whatever the outcome, this essential relationship will 
become increasingly central in the coming years.  
 
Human security 
Another conceptual narrative relevant to the future weapons management discourse relates to 
the term of human security. Emerging in the development discourse of the early 1990s and 
introduced in the 1994 UNDP Development Report, this concept reframes the traditional 
understanding of security. It results from the growing understanding that individuals and 
communities should feature at the core of security concerns or, in the words of former 
Canadian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy, “it has become clear that individual security is not 
necessarily the product of national security [and that it requires] a shift in focus, from ensuring 
peace across state borders to building peace within states.”(Lloyd Axworthy, “Towards A New 
Multilateralism”, p. 451)                                                         2 Two of the key processes as part of the preparation for these post-2015 decisions, the Secretary General’s High 
Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda and the Open Working Group process around the Sustainable 
Development Goals have both endorsed in one way or another the inclusion of peace and security language into 
the post-2015 development agenda. 
 7 
Thus, human security expressly recognises new emerging security threats beyond those 
stemming from armed violence, such as environmental, societal, political and economic threats 
and also acknowledges that the lack of physical protection from violence is a major challenge 
to the survival, livelihood and dignity of people. Development, security and human rights are 
not only imperatives, but they reinforce each other as stated by the Secretary-General in his 
2005 “In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all” report 
(A/59/2005, para 16). As a consequence, the concept of human security could be defined by 
freedom from fear and freedom from want.  
However, the understanding of what human security means and what it encompasses has not 
gone unchallenged. Critics regard the approach comprising freedom from fear and freedom 
from want as too broad and suggest a more narrow interpretation, mostly with a focus on 
freedom from fear, meaning the threat or use of violence.  
Despite these diverging views on human security, United Nations Resolution 66/290, defines 
human security as an approach aimed at “identifying and addressing widespread and cross-
cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of [the] people” entailing among 
others the “the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair”, 
entitling them “to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to 
enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential.” (A/RES/66/290, 10 September 
2012, para 3) The inter-linkages between peace, development and human rights are clearly 
articulated. Being at the same time an objective in itself and a people-focused and rights-based 
approach to achieve this objective, human security shares important aspects of humanitarian 
disarmament or armed violence reduction and embeds them in a broader conceptual 
narrative. With an increasing emphasis on the linkages between peace and development or, in 
the context of the Post-2015 Development Agenda, on the importance of sustainability and 
environmental protection, human security may serve as one of the potentially relevant 
frameworks for mine action.  
 
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict  
The “humanitarian disarmament” and the “armed violence” orientations noted above both 
have the victimization of civilians from weapons and strategies for the prevention of civilian 
harm at their heart. Initiatives aimed at strengthening norms and practice for the “protection 
of civilians in armed conflict” makes up a closely allied feature of global attention.  
 
This is perhaps best exemplified by the recent 22 November 2013 “Report of the Secretary-
General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict” (S/2013/689), the latest in a long 
series of reports to the Security Council on this topic. This report, noting once again that the 
“need to strengthen efforts to prevent and respond to violations of international humanitarian 
and human rights law in situations of conflict and violence has been at the forefront of 
discussions within the United Nations and its agencies, funds and programmes” (para 2), 
highlights a number of current settings, particularly Syria, where civilians are bearing the brunt 
of civil conflict. The report also takes note of a key dimension of the impact of armed violence 
on civilians—new and emerging weapons technologies, such as the use of drones and the 
potential threats posed by autonomous weapons systems. 
 
Allied to the general concern about the protection of civilians in armed conflict, of course, are 
initiatives aimed at making visible the nature of and reducing the impact of armed conflict on 
children and on women and girls. In the former, for example, is the issue of the use of children 
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in forces party to armed conflicts (see, for example, the recent Security Council Resolution on 
this topic, S/res/2143, 7 March 2014). In the latter, the prevalence of sexual violence as a 
terrible feature of armed conflict situations is of particular concern (see, for example, M. 
Bastick, K Grimm, and R. Kunz, Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict: Global Overview and 
Implications for the Security Sector, DCAF, 2007; and International Campaign to Stop Rape and 
Gender Violence in Conflict: www.stoprapeinconflict.org) . Forming a foundation for much of 
the action that followed its passage has been SC Resolution 1325 (31October 2000) on 
Women, Peace and Security. (www.unorg/womenwatch/wps/).  
 
Conflict prevention and peacebuilding  
The expansion of UN engagement in conflict situations from around 1990, made possible by 
the easing of the East-West Cold War tensions that had hamstrung the UN’s role in peace 
operations through much of its first 45 years, brought with it new understanding of and 
attention to the dynamics and challenges of peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict. The 
creation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission in 2005 (A/RES/60/180 and S/RES/1645, 20 
December 2005) represented both a kind pulling together of what was understood at the time 
about the requirements for sustaining peace in the aftermath of armed conflict and symbolic 
of what would become a new range of activities by the UN system in the years that have 
followed.  
  
Two areas of post-conflict focus stand out as of particular significance to the concerns of the 
present analysis. The first has been the attention given to “disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration” (DDR) as part of post-conflict peace consolidation processes. DDR processes are 
aimed at helping to secure an environment in which societies can begin to transition from 
conflict to peace and development. Essentially this orientation in policy and practice stems 
from the recognition that the prevention of a return to armed conflict and the building of 
sustainable peace depends to some extent on the success of approaches to dealing with the 
collection and disposal of the weapons that fuelled the conflict, the demobilization of those 
who have been engaged as combatants in the conflict and their successful social and economic 
reintegration into civil society.  
 
A related but broader and more long-term element understood now as an important part of 
post-conflict peacebuilding and development is that of Security Sector (or Security System) 
Reform (SSR). SSR is referred to by the UN as “a process of assessment, review and 
implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its 
goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples 
without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law” (First Report 
of the Secretary General on SSR, A/62/659-S2008/39, para.17).   Understood generally as 
including the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision 
and oversight of security in a country, security sector reform focuses on the range of elements 
responsible for different dimensions of security in a country—defence, law enforcement, 
corrections, intelligence services institutions responsible for border management, customs and 
civil emergencies, as well as elements of the judicial sector. Relevant actors include ministries, 
legislative bodies, regional and local government, and civil society groups.  
 
But these are just two components of an expanding understanding of the multi-faceted nature 
of peacebuilding, a field of endeavour by international agencies, regional organizations, nation 
states and civil society actors that now looks well beyond the post-conflict orientation that 
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characterized much of the earlier focus at the UN level and raising up existing understanding of 
conflict prevention thinking and peacebuilding methodologies as a continuum of relevant 
actions across time in fragile and conflict prone or affected settings.3 4   
 
Among the most significant international efforts in recent years with respect to so-called 
“fragile” states5 and fragile situations has been the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding 
and Statebuilding. The International Dialogue has brought together the so-called G7+ group of 
states (self-identified states that are or have been affected by conflict), donor and other 
countries, and international organizations to: a)share peacebuilding and statebuilding 
experiences, good practices and constraints to delivering effective assistance in support of 
peacebuilding and statebuilding; b)identify, agree on, and implement a set of peacebuilding 
and statebuilding goals and commitments to guide national and international interventions in 
conflict affected and fragile states; and c) build political momentum for change and trust 
between fragile and conflict affected countries, development partners, and civil society.  While 
not uncontroversial, especially in the context of larger development debates, in particular the 
post-2015 development agenda discussion, this focus on elements aimed at building 
conditions that reduce the potential for the outbreak of violent conflict is illustrative of conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding initiatives and approaches currently underway.  
 
This section has presented in an abbreviated way a number of key streams of 
conceptualization to which mine action can be understood to be related at the present time. 
Rather than being distinct and unique processes, they represent frames of reference—and 
different starting points—for understanding problems and shaping actions.  
 
A number of elements common to all should be noted. In general, each of these narratives 
incorporates to one degree or another, a gender-based orientation as part of its 
conceptualization and in the manifestation of different policy and programmatic elements. All 
have as their basis an understanding that action must take place at a range of levels, 
particularly the community level. And all recognize the importance of partnership as a basis for 
action, with civil society understood to have key roles to play. They also have in common that 
relevant programming emerging from these streams is increasingly subject to demands for 
building in “monitoring and evaluation” components as an expected part of programme 
delivery. Importantly, however, all are affected by political considerations, including classical                                                         3 Drawing on the earlier “peacebuilding palette” presented in the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding Towards a 
Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 2004), the 
OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) usefully takes note of 4 key elements of conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding work—socio-economic development; good governance; reform of justice and security institutions; 
and culture of justice, truth and reconciliation. “Guidance on Evaluation Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding 
Activities,” OECD DAC, 2008. 4 One example of this maturing understanding of the integrated nature of elements in conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding can be seen in the following from the OECD DAC: “. . . Official Development Assistance (ODA) for 
conflict prevention and peacebuilding more than doubled during the period 2000-05, as measured by reporting 
on the six conflict codes (security sector management and reform: civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and 
resolution; post-conflict peacebuilding; reintegration and SALW control; land mine clearance (emphasis added); 
and child soldiers.” (Guidance on Evaluation Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities, OECD DAC, 2008, 
p.13) 5 The OECD DAC identifies a “fragile” states as “one unable to meet its population’s expectations or manage 
changes in expectations and capacity through the political process.” (“Concepts and Dilemmas of Statebuilding in 
Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience”, OECD DAC, 2008).  
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national security and “state-centric” thinking, which can override the degree to which “people” 
actually remain the focus of efforts being made. 
  
Given their highly interrelated nature, it is difficult to say which orientation is likely to have the 
greatest traction as a direction for policy and programming in the coming period. To this 
observer, however, it seems likely that the “armed violence reduction” orientation, coupled 
with the growing sophistication of understanding in the conflict prevention and peacebuilding 
realm, will provide the most propitious basis for the immediate future. Why? It seems 
increasingly clear that, without serious efforts at reducing and preventing the effects of armed 
violence and without similar efforts at putting in place attitudes, processes, and institutions 
capable of tackling the drivers of conflict and violence, little real progress will be possible 
across so many sectors and the human development and human security agendas. As this 
understanding becomes more ingrained, attention, resources, and programming are likely to 
follow. In relation to the opening focus of this section—conventional weapons—the richness 
and utility of the armed violence reduction orientation is likely to become ever more 
appreciated. 
 
 
II.  Mine action: evolution, contribution, and limits 
 
This second section of the paper seeks to more specifically locate mine action in relation to 
these and to offer observations on possible directions for mine action. 
 
A. Locating mine action in the larger disarmament and security context 
 
Traditional components of mine action 
The newly published 5th edition of A Guide to Mine Action (Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), 2014) reminds readers that mine action, as traditionally 
understood, is “the combination of activities designed to: 
• reduce real and perceived risks to affected populations of landmines, cluster munitions, 
ammunition stockpiles and explosive remnants of war (ERW); 
• address consequences of accidents upon victims; 
• reduce economic, social and developmental consequences of contamination; and 
• advocate developing, adopting and complying with appropriate instruments of 
international humanitarian law (IHL).” (p. 14) 
 
These basics are presented here as a base-line from which to judge the evolving nature of mine 
action and its applications within the realm of the larger streams of activity outlined earlier in 
the paper. 
 
“Humanitarian disarmament” and beyond 
As noted earlier, those efforts at conventional weapons disarmament that can currently be 
seen as operating from a “humanitarian disarmament” perspective really owe their origins to 
the work on anti-personnel landmines of the mid-1990s. The bulk of mine action, by its very 
definition, continues today to operate primarily from this weapons-based orientation. Or, to 
make use once again of the armed violence “lens”, mine action, oriented as it is from a 
“people-centred” perspective—at least in a normative sense if not in actual practice—
continues principally based in the “instruments” corner of the lens. However, the nature of 
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implementation has led to engagement with elements related both to “institutions” and to 
“perpetrators”.  
  
The implementation of mine action—based in the implications of the components outlined 
above—has naturally led to engagement in areas well beyond its roots. There has been an 
expansion in practice from the initial concern with the realities of anti-personnel mines “in the 
field” to other related weapons concerns such as ERW and cluster munitions and to issues 
well-beyond the initial de-mining and recovery nature of the work, to areas such as 
ammunition and stockpile management and into a broadening of involvements based on the 
evolving understanding of the nature of the “core components” themselves. In addition, there 
has been engagement with or impact upon areas that would fall beyond “humanitarian 
disarmament” and into other streams such as development and peacebuilding.  
 
The push and pull of change in mine action 
The 2011 study “Mine Action—a description of working context” (prepared for GICHD by 
Ritherdon Consulting) took note of the changing nature of mine action, saying that “Mine 
action is becoming a less well-defined and more competitive place to be” and “Definitions of 
mine action are becoming more dilute, other activities are absorbing resources and funds that 
would previously have been dedicated to mine action. At the same time many mine action 
organisations are successfully moving into closely related fields.” The reasons and implications 
outlined in that study for these changes—e.g., that states are completing their obligations 
under the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention, that donors are changing the priorities and 
expectations—and their meaning for mine action probably remain still largely valid in 2014, if 
not more so.  
 
The GICHD’s own study “Mission Creep or Responding to Wider Security Needs?” (GICHD 
Policy Brief, December 2012) documents ways in which a number of mine action 
organizations—in response to a range of factors, including funding—have begun to re-orient 
their programming more broadly within a reduction of armed violence and promotion of public 
safety framework. This extends from a narrower expansion within the weapons-related basis 
for work (for example, Norwegian Peoples Aid which sees itself “expanding work from mine 
action to broader areas of humanitarian disarmament,” by which they mean “all operations 
and advocacy which aims to reduce and prevent harm to civilians from the impacts of weapons 
and ammunition . . . motivated and guided by humanitarian and development imperatives”) 
(NPA Strategy on Humanitarian Disarmament, 2014) to an expanded engagement with multi-
faceted dimensions of armed violence reduction and prevention (for example, Danish 
Demining Group (DDG), for whom traditional mine action has become but an element—along 
with capacity building of government and civil society, support to security providers, small 
arms management and conflict prevention—in a broad based integrated organizational 
strategy incorporating all dimensions of the AVR lens) (DDG Armed Violence Reduction 
Framework, Version 3, June 2012). 
 
As the original tasks for mine action are accomplished through the progressive, if differential, 
meeting of Treaty obligations by State Parties and increasing conformity to the mine ban norm 
by States currently outside the APMBC, it is likely that there will be a continuing blurring of the 
boundaries between original concepts and foci of mine action and other streams of work. 
Given this, some questions seem of importance in the shaping of a future for mine action: 
what remains essential about mine action for the immediate future; at what point in the 
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extension of understanding of what passes for mine action is it actually no longer mine action 
but something else; where can experience of mine action in practice bring useful learning into 
the broader realms that have been outlined in the first part of this paper; what learning is 
there from these broader realms that might be applicable to current understanding and 
practice of mine action? To answer such questions in any depth would require a much more 
thorough and lengthy study than has been possible here. However, some observations on 
these and other issues will be made in the following sub-section that it is hoped can shed light 
on these questions. 
 
B. Orientations for the future 
 
• Finishing the job. There are sound reasons for the push and pull of mine action into ever 
broader spheres, some of which are clearly natural outgrowths of the life of mine action 
and others which may be taking practitioners well beyond the original scope of mine action 
for other reasons. Nevertheless there is still a job to be done in terms of completing the 
specific national commitments under the APMBC and the CCM. While the “clearance” 
dimension of this presents particular challenges and choices (as noted in the 2011 
“context” study for GICHD), there will be a continuing need in the coming years for the 
expertise and experience, so deliberately and expensively built up over the last two 
decades, to be sustained and continue to be available. This will be particularly important in 
engaging effectively and supportively the transitions facing countries as they assume ever 
more ongoing responsibility for their own situations. A range of other challenges consistent 
with ensuring the universalization, implementation, and sustainability of the APMBC, 
Protocol V, and CCM will remain for the years ahead. The mine action community needs to 
continue to keep its “eyes on the prize” as a first order of business, making certain that 
there remains a hard core of focus and commitment.6 
 
• Building the logic of synergy and not competition on conventional weapons initiatives with 
other parts of the conventional weapons community. The progression from mine and ERW 
clearance to physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) by parts of the mine 
action community is understandable and in many ways a logical development. Given their 
weapons and munitions experience in unstable settings, mine action practitioners are well 
placed to work alongside other security actors in these pursuits. But what this extension 
has done has been to bring mine action organizations into areas that others have also 
begun to invest in, but from orientations rather different from that of mine action. For 
example, the multi-stakeholder Regional Approach to Stockpile Reduction (RASR) (which is 
supported by a range of initiatives, none of which are founded from a mine action 
orientation—the Office of Weapons Reduction and Abatement of the US State 
Department, the NATO Support Agency, the Small Arms Survey, and others).  This would 
suggest the desirability of the development of shared operational definitions, agreed 
strategies, and mutual learning.  The evolution of the International Ammunition Technical 
Guidelines (IATG) and related elements such as the Technical Review Board and the 
Strategic Coordination Group are movements in this direction.   
                                                         6 The International Campaign to Ban Landmines has, for example, called for the mine ban community to take up 
the “completion challenge”—“to ensure that the work started several years ago is actually completed as soon as 
possible, and not later than 10 years after the Third Review Conference.” (www.icbl.org).  
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Global attention to dealing with small arms and light weapons (SALW), as noted above, has 
developed much more from an arms control perspective than from a “humanitarian 
disarmament” one.  Despite this, on the ground experience demonstrates commonalities 
related to dealing with the different realities of weapons and ammunition. This would 
suggest that there are probably many missed opportunities at the present time for learning 
how to frame thinking and action more mutually between the mine action and SALW 
communities. These two arenas, however, remain very much silo-ed attitudinally, 
programmatically, and operationally. The AVR orientation offers scope for there to be 
much more inclusivity and for the realization of synergies between these two communities. 
(It was noted earlier that Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development 
emerged from what was perceived as the limited “supply-side” nature of much of the work 
on small arms to that point). One possible direction, for example, might be for there to be 
an effort to include in appropriate ways useful elements of International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS) within the emerging International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) 
or in some other way bring these two sets of standards in closer sync with each other.  The 
already mentioned IATGs and the RASR initiative represent existing attempts at developing 
coherence from the “instruments” dimension of the AVR perspective. The actual 
experience of mine action organisations that are also dealing with SALW-related issues in 
the field has no doubt helped in the development of synergies (such as the case with NPA, 
MAG, and DDG, noted earlier). 
 
In “Linking Security Sector Reform and Armed Violence Reduction,” the OECD DAC draws 
attention to the ways in which the AVR “lens” can shine light on logical areas for policy and 
programming on SSR, including a useful range of sector approaches (accountability and 
oversight; defence reform; intelligence and security; border management; police; justice; 
prisons; private security and military companies; civil society) to “instruments.” 
(Programming Note, OECD DAC, 2011). Mine action receives no specific attention within 
these, but there is no reason why this could not be an area of further development, given 
the important entry point for international engagement provided by mine action in post-
conflict settings.  One observer has noted that, despite the need for more coherent, 
coordinated international approaches to supporting states emerging from conflict, 
“relatively little attention has been given to security and development pay-offs that can be 
generated through thinking about mine action and SSR in a ‘joined up’ manner. Mine 
action and SSR remain parallel activities, even when undertaken by the same actors in the 
same theatres.” (Alan Bryden, DCAF, personal correspondence, 2013).  
 
• Developing common approaches and initiatives around “victims” and “survivor” issues. One 
of the major innovative elements of the APMBC and its work over the years has been the 
important dimension of addressing the needs of those individuals and communities 
victimized by landmine “accidents”. This dimension has been built into the subsequent 
CCM and has become a regular element in “humanitarian disarmament” thinking more 
broadly. The recent study “Five Key Examples of the Role of Mine Action in Integrating 
Victim Assistance into Broader Frameworks” (Antipersonnel Mine Ban Convention- 
Implementation Support Unit , 2014) demonstrates efforts to bring the lessons from this 
dimension of mine action to a wider range of disability and development 
initiatives. Similarly, the April 2014 “Bridges between Worlds” conference in Medellin is an 
effort to look at the future of the victim assistance dimension of mine action work from the 
related reference point of disability, with the goal of learning both ways. Somewhat 
 14 
surprisingly, one area remains so far largely outside this world: survivors of small arms and 
light weapons violence. The “arms control” nature of much SALW work at the political level 
has evolved without a deliberate “humanitarian” dimension. This has meant that there is 
virtually no attention to the issue of “victims” and “survivors” within formal SALW 
initiatives, despite the appalling statistics of deaths and injuries due to the use and mis-use 
of SALW. The current Surviving Gun Violence Project (www.survivinggunviolence.org) is 
seeking to reverse this, but it remains a distant element in overall SALW work. It would 
seem that there could be much to be gained by seeking to bring more closely into alliance 
the mine action and SALW work in this area. Engagement with the WHO, with its core 
theme on violence prevention, and the health sector in general, offer avenues for building 
these links. 
 
• Dealing with questions related to armed non-state actors. The treaty basis of mine action 
has meant that the highly relevant “perpetrator” questions surrounding armed non-state 
actors have not been central to the formal institutions related to mine action. 
Nevertheless, the significant work of the civil society organization “Geneva Call”, in its 
initiatives engaging in dialogue with such groups on questions like compliance with 
international norms on AP mines, protection of children in armed conflict, and issues of 
sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict, has ensured that this area has received 
attention from an actor based in the mine action community. Armed non-state actors 
(from gangs to criminal groups to private security companies to opposition militaries, etc.) 
will remain a key feature of conflict and security needs at all levels, from controlling the 
movement and use of conventional weapons to the protection of civilians. While the 
leadership on such issues is likely to reside elsewhere than with mine action, the learning, 
experience and developments from other streams (e.g. lessons from Arms Trade Treaty 
experience, once implementation gets fully under way) need to be engaged in shaping 
responses from within the mine action sector in relation to armed non-state actors related 
issues. (See “Armed Non-State Actors: Current Trends and Future Challenges,” DCAF 
Horizon 2015 Working Paper No. 5, DCAF and Geneva Call, 2014). 
 
• Embedding mine action in the AVR framework. In the first part of this paper, it was argued 
that the AVR framework probably offers the most propitious orientation for the future of 
initiatives based in their essence in a conventional weapons and their implications 
perspective. This is due in part to the fact that it can be seen--in its broadest sense—to 
incorporate in one way or another the other approaches.  The GICHD “Mission Creep” 
paper, as noted, documents the differing ways in which mine action organizations have 
sought to “reframe” their work from an AVR perspective. Building on the earlier points 
made in this sub-section about the applicability of AVR thinking, it can be argued that 
placing the future of mine action within the AVR framework in appropriate ways will allow 
for a greater consciousness of the particular contributions that mine action can make to 
different dimensions of AVR, while bringing mine action organizations into potentially 
mutually beneficial relations with other actors engaged in the range of dimensions 
incorporated within the AVR framework.  
 
This line of argument deserves much more analysis than has been able to be developed 
here. Nevertheless, a few additional observations seem of some importance: 
o While nearly all elements of mine action can be considered in one way or another 
to be subsumed under the general banner of armed violence reduction, not all 
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elements of AVR-related work are necessarily appropriate to the mine action 
sector. Organizations need to ask themselves when broadening their scope of 
activity whether in fact they are still essentially mine action organizations. DDG has 
chosen to embrace the AVR framework and consequently expanded its work, but 
has consciously placed its mine action work as only one of a range of integrated 
programmatic components. Without such a conscious approach, “mission creep” 
into ever broader areas risks diluting some of the essential ongoing components of 
mine action while not necessarily offering particular added value to other elements 
where there may already be other more specialized, experienced actors.  
o Two potentially limiting dimensions of seeing mine action as able to be subsumed 
under the AVR orientation relate to 1) the fact that the mine action focus on mines, 
cluster munitions, and explosive remnants of war represent armed violence that 
has happened in the past; and 2) the question of intentionality (i.e., as “armed 
violence” is conventionally defined as “the intentional use of illegitimate force 
(actual or threatened)”, given that mines in the ground and ERW retain only an 
potential for unintentional violence). These distinctions to this observer of relatively 
little importance, at least so far as the application of the lens is seen as focusing 
principally on “instruments” all of which have the potential at least to inflict a 
violent impact, whether past or not and whether intended or not. 
o Mine action and development. The evolution of mine action has brought attention 
to a range of areas of work that can be understood to have positive development 
effects, in particular the socio-economic benefits associated with the release of land 
and alternative employment opportunities for former combatants.  The broader 
AVR perspective suggested here would suggest the need for mine action 
organizations in the development of programmes to fully understand the 
relationship between particular initiatives and their potential positive 
“developmental” effects and the particular niche that these initiatives fill in relation 
to the broad range of development concerns.7  
o Mine action and peacebuilding. A similar perspective can be brought to bear on the 
closely related area of the contribution to the multi-dimensional arena of 
peacebuilding that is posited for mine action. The 2008 study “Peacebuilding and 
Humanitarian Mine action” (Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies and , 
Landmine Action UK) brought considerable precision to this thinking, 
contextualizing the discussion within the broad perspectives on security and 
development offered by the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and 
Development. Mine action programming, with hope for conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding impacts, will be enhanced by clear theories of change emerging from 
within the parameters for specific application of the AVR framework. 
o Understanding the problem: building the evidence base. Successful policies and 
programmes depend on solid evidence of the problem at hand. The development of 
the AVR orientation is spawning a number of initiatives in this regard. The following 
are mentioned as examples. The Global Burden of Armed Violence 2008 and 2011                                                         7 In the first part of this paper, it was argued that due to a range of factors there may be limited hopes for the 
incorporation of specific goals related to security and peace in the expected outcomes of the post-2015 
development goals negotiations. Despite this, the relevance of these themes to the realization of the 
contributions of sustainable development and positive development to reduction of armed violence remain. Mine 
action agendas need to be built consciously into this thinking, while recognizing that the contributions of mine 
action will be specific and not comprehensive. 
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(Geneva Declaration Secretariat; new edition expected in 2014) provides critical 
evidence of the ways in which armed violence is manifested in different regions of 
the world. The development of crime and armed violence observatories and armed 
violence monitoring systems (AVMs) is increasingly seen as providing capacity for 
being able to accurately depict the different realities of armed violence. (See, 
“Violence reduction and peacebuilding: how crime and violence observatories can 
contribute,” a report of the Expert Meeting, 26 – 28 June 2013, on 
www.smallarmssurvey.org). A broad spectrum of civil society organizations are 
currently developing a template for assisting states in building national systems to 
monitor insecurity and armed violence. At national and local levels, public health 
institutions, security agencies and civil society organizations are increasingly 
engaging in measuring and monitoring problems associated with armed violence. 
Although well supported with its own measuring and monitoring capacities, there is 
clearly scope and possible mutual benefit for the field of mine action to pull closer 
to such initiatives. 
o Mine action and the environment. The 2011 “context” study (p. 15) highlights some 
of the challenges being presented by particular mine action activities. Appropriate 
responses to these challenges will best be developed in collaboration with other 
actors from outside the mine action community with specialized knowledge of 
environmental and sustainable development best practices. 
o Mine action and gender. The 2011 “context” paper also notes that “compared o 
other humanitarian and development sectors, mine action continues to lag behind 
in terms of equal opportunities and gender mainstreaming.” (p.11). A “gender” lens 
to understanding issues and developing appropriate policies and programmes is, as 
noted in the first part of this paper, an important cross-cutting dimensions of 
perspectives on armed violence reduction, development, and peacebuilding. 
Particularly appropriate dimensions for mine action will best be developed in 
reference to developments in this more comprehensive context. 
 
 
In this second part of the paper, the intention has been to locate mine action within and in 
relation to the constellation of relevant approaches highlighted in the first part of the paper 
and to draw some implications for the practice of the mine action sector. Based on the 
observations presented here, a few summary conclusions can be drawn:  
• The armed violence reduction frame of reference provides a propitious domain into 
which mine action and its future developments can be put; 
• Mine action and other related sectors have much to offer each other; 
• Plans to move beyond the essential understood components of mine action by 
traditional mine actors need to be undertaken within the context of a clear theory of 
change; 
• There remain fundamental mine action-related tasks to be accomplished. While 
framing these in broader approaches may help to make them more attuned to 
contemporary needs, there is an ongoing legitimacy to mine action the means, skills 
and tools for which need to be sustained. 
 
4 May 2014 
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Annex 
Observations on the role of the GICHD 
 
The present paper offered a survey of ways of thinking and approaches that appear to be of 
creative relevance to issues related to conventional weapons. It then examined how mine 
action can be seen in relation to these and offered views on ways forward. The Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has been a central player for nearly 
two decades in the field of mine action. Its leadership has been critical to practice in this field. 
It has an important continuing role. This Annex offers a few observations on directions for that 
continuing role, based primarily on the logic of the core elements of the paper. It does not 
attempt to duplicate thinking that has already been done in, among others, the 2011 “Mine 
action—a description of working context” study or GICHD’s own Strategy 2012-14. Rather it 
seeks to complement and build on some of the thinking already apparently a part of internal 
GICHD reflections.  
 
1. Remaining focused on practical work still to be completed. Quite apart from the implications 
of the broader themes presented in this paper, there are still essential operational tasks which 
countries are facing in completing their obligations under the APMBT and CCM which will 
demand resources and support. A range of transition challenges can be seen to lie ahead. The 
GICHD, which has been so critical in assisting national and local actors, can continue to be 
important in this life phase of mine action. To do so effectively it will need to sustain and 
strengthen its cutting-edge technical and practical expertise. It needs to continue to be the “go 
to” place for practitioners in the field and to continue to be able to offer support based on in-
house expertise and experience. It will need to capacitate itself for assisting with some of the 
expected challenging features of the coming period (see, e.g. the “Standards in other sectors” 
and the “Relationships, interfaces and ownership” of the 2011 “Context” study, pp. 11 and 17 
respectively). 
 
2. Being an interpreter and bridge-builder for the mine action community to the broader armed 
violence, development, and peacebuilding challenges and opportunities. The GICHD has been 
doing this in a variety of ways—e.g. through the “Mission Creep” study and the other activities 
of its Security and Development Programme. In doing this, however, it does not necessarily 
follow that an implication for the overall programming of GICHD is to engage in ever-broader 
areas of work itself. Rather the job could be more narrowly defined as assisting the mine action 
community of actors in understanding how these broader perspectives can inform and 
strengthen ongoing mine action programming, how mine action theory and practice can be 
built into and inform the broader agendas, and how mine action practitioners can effectively 
and constructively engage actors from other relevant communities. Given that there is a huge 
number of actors at work in the whole range of areas that have been spotlighted in this paper, 
the continued relevance of a centre such as GICHD, fundamentally dedicated to mine action, 
will, it would seem, depend the extent it can stay grounded in and capacitated for what it 
knows and does best.  
 
3. Helping to build strategic partnerships. This paper has pointed to a number of places where 
synergies could be realized between mine action and other areas (e.g. weapons management, 
“survivor” issues, gender mainstreaming, implications for development, environmental 
concerns, building armed violence evidence bases, etc.), where the GICHD could play an 
important role in bringing relevant actors together for both the elaboration of possible 
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collaborative approaches or clarification of specific strategic roles of different sectors aimed at 
reducing overlap and realizing synergies. 
 
4. Doing it in Geneva. With the arguments of 3 above in mind, the GICHD could play a stronger 
role in helping to build a greater degree of coherency and mutually agreed foci of 
specialization among the centres of excellence in Geneva of greatest relevance in areas related 
to the concerns of this study. These include not only the core “centres” (GICHD, GCSP, and 
DCAF, as well as the Small Arms Survey and the Secretariat of the Geneva Declaration on 
Armed Violence and Development) but also the Geneva Academy of International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, Centre on Conflict, 
Peacebuilding and Development, the Geneva Forum; the ICRC, the WHO and a range of civil 
society organizations such as Interpeace. Seeking out and building specific partnerships based 
on the integrity and specialization of each programme could reduce turf issues, sharpen the 
work of the individual programmes, strengthen synergies and increase the overall contribution 
of Geneva. This is not something that GICHD could or should do on its own but a more 
deliberate engagement of this sort could, it would seem, pay dividends. The January 2013 
Nairobi workshop on armed violence for mine action practitioners, jointly organized between 
GICHD and the Geneva Declaration Secretariat, is an example such a fruitful partnership. The 
annual IPDET workshops, jointly organized by GICHD, DCAF, GCSP, and the Small Arms Survey, 
aimed at capacitating staffs on the common elements of monitoring and evaluation and 
related subjects, is a further example of what can be done. 
 
5. Norm and policy imperatives. The elemental foundation in international humanitarian law 
on which the Treaty-based work of the GICHD stands remains fundamental to the particular 
work and contributions of the Centre in relation to assistance to policy development at the 
national level, assistance with adherence to international instruments (e.g. the work of the 
ISU), and to the broader application to the development of new weapons-related instruments 
and practices. Equally, there is a clear ongoing need for the GICHD in situating itself 
strategically and assisting as appropriate from a mine action perspective in national and 
international policy developments. The better the GICHD understands and can articulate the 
nature and place of mine action in relation to larger frameworks such as AVR the more it will 
be able to ensure the inclusive nature of these frameworks while also playing an important 
role in feeding key elements of these back into the mine action policy sectors. 
 
6. Programme development and implementation. A number of additional elements relevant to 
programme development and implementation will, it would seem, remain of importance to 
the continuing role of the GICHD, both in support for existing components of mine action and 
for current or future extensions to broader dimensions as outlined in this paper. The 2011 
“Context” paper took note that “There is no agreed, global research agenda for mine action, 
although there is general agreement that such an agenda is desirable.” (p. 13). Growing from 
perspectives offered in this paper, perhaps this is an area where GICHD could assume a greater 
degree of engagement. Related to this, GICHD could consider how it might further contribute 
to “understanding the problem; building the evidence” initiatives, as outlined at the end of 
part II of this paper.  The investment that GICHD has made in “quality management” 
(assessment and control) learning and training should continue to provide an important 
contribution to the delivery of good programmes. Similarly, results-based planning and the 
integration of Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) into programme development and 
implementation will be of increasing importance to the programme of the GICHD itself and 
what it can offer to others.  
